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Introduction:  
Modern Crisis  
and Classical Remedies
In everyday language, solidari-
ty functions as a catchword. It has 
earned a certain notoriety through 
newspaper headlines and is widely 
associated with the banners of the 
Polish “Solidarity” socio-political movement, or as part of the famous 
French saying, liberté, egalité, fraternité. Even though solidarity is one of 
the main foundations of the European legal system, there is no theory 
of solidarity, in the vein of the theories of freedom, equality and justice. 
Apart from this vagueness, the concept also suffers from ambiguity. It is 
sometimes used as a synonym for compassion, mercy or charity; at other 
times, it is interpreted as civic friendship or legal principle. In the preva-
iling contemporary legal interpretations, solidarity is reduced to “state 
benevolence,” i.e. the so-called welfare-state, with its over-expanded bu-
reaucratic machine. Even worse, solidarity is sometimes associated with 
the Leviathan-like communist rhetoric that has appealed to the values of 
international (workers’) brotherhoods.
This complicated history of the concept and the ambiguity of its mean-
ing renders solidarity unattractive. This unattractiveness is augmented 
 1 The article was written as part of the “Solidarity as an ethical and legal principle” research 
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by the volatile nature of modernity, suspicious towards all forms of 
common good and long-lasting commitment. Solidarity is regarded as 
a threat to individual freedom, and a dangerous projection of utopian 
spirit discredited by 20th century totalitarianism. However, despite this 
modern crisis, appeals to solidarity have not lessened, proving that it is 
not only a practically needed concept, but also an intellectually intrigu-
ing one. This paper presents the thesis that, contrary to popular opin-
ion, solidarity is a freedom-enhancing power. To prove this, it will be 
necessary to reach back ad fontes – to the very beginnings of solidarity 
in the ancient and Judaeo-Christian tradition.
1. Ancient Roots of Solidarity
“All for One, One for All” – The Private-Public Phenomenon
The most natural etymological source of solidarity is a category 
of debt known as in solidum. The Latin word solidus means “dense, 
lasting, total.” The Roman law liability in solidum (“in full”) was in-
deed solid, lasting, and total. It was also radical: debtors were liable 
for the entire obligation, and were obliged to repay the debt of all the 
other debtors. As such, a person deciding to enter into such a legal 
relationship had to be ready, in case of failure, to carry the burden 
of their partners in the arrangement. As those most famous solidary 
partners in literature, the three musketeers, were prone to declaring, 
“All for one, one for all.”
The only “method” that could explain this sort of “madness” is trust, 
or rather the madness of trust. The first, most fundamental feature of 
solidary communities is their basis in radical trust, occasionally even 
resembling private or personal relationships. At the same time, a soli-
dary community is public in nature, as in most cases partners in the 
societas put their agreement into a contractual framework, legalizing 
and publicizing it. Traced back to antiquity, the legal, public sources 
of solidarity are immensely important in the context of contemporary 
attempts to privatize and sentimentalize it as the rather blurry idea of 
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a universal fraternité, or instinctual compassion. They prove instead 
that solidarity, at its source, was a bridging concept: it brings togeth-
er the private and the public, introducing high-quality relationships 
based on deep mutual trust to the formalised, distanced world of pub-
lic relationships.
Still, legal institutions are only normative derivatives of informal so-
cial institutions, so in order to understand how this paradoxical (“mi-
raculous”) combination of radical, almost personal trust and formalised 
public relationships (as encapsulated in the concept of liability in soli-
dum) has been made possible, it is necessary to make a more thorough 
examination of the founding fathers of solidarity, the solidary commu-
nities of antiquity.
Radicalism of Friendship
Like the Greeks, the Romans valued friendship very highly. Aristotle 
wrote that friendship is “[…] most necessary with a view to living. For 
without friends no one would choose to live, though he had all other 
goods.”2 Cicero stated that friendship “[…] projects the bright ray of 
hope into the future, and does not suffer the spirit to grow faint or to 
fall.”3 A closer look at the principles of this definition of friendship will 
be useful, as these are the principles underlying the radical co-respon-
sibility of the concept of in solidum debt.
The first and most apparent feature is the fact that its formal prerequi-
site was freedom. The importance of freedom as a formal condition has 
two aspects. Firstly, friendship could be established only between free 
men. Slaves, at least in the opinion of ancient theorists, were deprived of 
the pleasures of friendship, as having no legal capacity, they were stuck in 
family relationships, relationships hallowed with blood ties or the sanctity 
of hearth and home, i.e. relationships not rooted in free choice. Second-
ly, not every man that was formally free could establish a relationship 
 2 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, trans. W. D. Ross, Oxford 2009, VIII, 1155a.
 3 Cicero, Laelius on Friendship, Barnsley 1991, VII, 23.
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of friendship, as this required a certain level of economic and social 
self-sufficiency that guaranteed gratuitousness (“Friendships therefore 
based on pleasure and on and utility can exist between two bad men”4). 
Self-sufficiency also guaranteed the necessary equality in the relation-
ship, unlike, for instance, an asymmetrical merchant friendship, where 
the friend-benefactor has a higher position than the one that needs his 
beneficence, and this beneficence must be compensated for with some-
thing more than “just liking,” for example, reverence expressed by the 
friend-beneficiary. Freedom was not only a formal, external prerequisite 
of friendship, but also its internal requirement. In order to afford pure 
friendship one had to be “affluent” enough. Aristotle described this kind 
of internal affluence with a notion of philautos.5 Philautos, according to 
the etymological roots of the term, is a person who is self-loving, but in 
the noble sense of self-love. Its “nobility” flows from the fact that it is not 
based on greed for material goods, but on the striving for nobler aims, the 
greater good and higher beauty. Philautos thus is not meant as egoistic 
and self-seeking, but as “virtue-seeking,” and by means of this virtuous-
ness, worthy of self-respect and self-love. In parallel with the politically 
and financially self-sufficient person, the philautos does not look for any 
emotional reward (as this person already has one good friend – them-
selves), but can give the other a pure liking, and give it freely. This free-
ness, this “gratuitous” character of friendship, highlighted by Aristotle on 
every level – political, social and mental – reveals that a “pure friendship” 
is a “gift relationship.” The philautos is freely giving of perfect love from 
his internal abundance, and as he chooses equally virtuous friends, this 
gift doesn’t go unreturned. However, this kind of reciprocity should not 
be conceived as an exchange of goods, but rather a sharing of goodness 
(“common love for the good”) and common effort in its creation (“cul-
tivation of virtue”). Free, perfectly-loving and reciprocal friendship has 
consequences for the theory of solidarity. It distinguishes this notion from 
its closest contemporary cousins – ordinary, business-like cooperation 
 4 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, op. cit., VIII, 1157a.
 5 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, op. cit., IX, 1168b-1169b.
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based on mutual interests on the one hand (when the interest in cooper-
ation with the other comes down to one’s own “encapsulated interest”6), 
and charity based on the asymmetrical relationship of beneficence on 
the other. Authentic friendship-based solidarity unifies both aspects: 
voluntary, reciprocal cooperation of equals, with their mutual need for 
being rooted in a greater, common good.
The relationship between freedom and friendship was mutual: not 
only was freedom, both in the external and internal aspects, a ticket to 
friendship, but also – reciprocally – friendship allowed for freedom to 
flourish. Where does this intertwinement between friendship and free-
dom come from? Why was friendship considered to be the ultimate good 
(“Without friends no one would choose to live”7)? Firstly, because of its 
epistemic function, dialogue with a friend helped in learning the truth. 
The Greek man, who knew neither the concept nor the method of in-
trospection, could se ipsum noscere only by acting (“testing himself ”) in 
the social world. But having a friend played a special role in the process 
of knowing oneself. Having a liking for someone purely for their char-
acter was the ultimate confirmation of their excellence (areté). More-
over, friendship allowed not only for learning the truth about oneself, 
but also about the external world, as confirmed by Plato having written 
his works in the form of dialogues and discussions between members of 
the Academic school school: the Greek never learned the truth sitting 
alone, but through friendly conversation or occasionally, fierce dispute. 
Secondly, friendship opened not only the horizon of truth, but also the 
horizon of goodness. Aristotle asks: “What is the use of such prosperity 
without the opportunity of beneficence, which is exercised chiefly and in 
its most laudable form towards friends?”8 One cannot overestimate the 
importance of this intriguing quote, as it proves that in the understanding 
of the Greeks, a friend is not only an alter ego, an epistemic mirror, but 
primarily an alter, someone who is fundamentally different and distinct. 
 6 Cf. R. Hardin, Trust, Cambridge 2006, p. 1.
 7 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, op. cit., VIII, 1155a.
 8 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, op. cit., 1155a.
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Doing good to that person allows for going beyond oneself, thus creat-
ing an opportunity to expand the ego and bring about the “miracle” of 
altruism. For the Greeks, friendship was a way to go beyond oneself, to 
follow the highest purpose available in the life of an individual: serving 
virtue. This ethical aspect of friendship is even more emphasized in the 
idealistic philosophy of Plato, who introduced the concept of the “first 
friend” (the proton Philon9): the idea of the Good. Plato sensed the exist-
ence of a metaphysical good (Aristotle shared this view, as expressed in 
his Metaphysics), and his concept of friendship shows it very clearly. In 
contrast, Aristotle’s concept of friendship, although rooted in a greater, 
common good, was a drama played out between earthly actors. These 
were noble, “good” characters, who acted freely, cultivated virtue and re-
alized higher values, thus proving the existence of a metaphysical element 
in human nature and our “natural” metaphysical hunger, but still – the 
scene of their play was irreducibly horizontal. Plato’s universe was richer: 
he introduced the concept of the “first friend” (the proton Philon): the 
idea of the Good. Although it was a concept, an idea, not a personage in 
a full sense, it had a fruitful potential. This is vividly illustrated in Plato’s 
Symposium, wherein Diotyma explains the idea of “being pregnant in 
soul.” This kind of pregnancy, which gives birth in beauty, presupposes 
a different kind of romance – romance with Beauty itself. This romance, 
as well as its fruits – “the proper ordering of cities and households”10 and 
“making young men better”11 – shows that in Plato, ideas have a more 
independent and causal status, even if their realization, or embodiment, 
lies within the realm of human responsibilities. Plato’s idealism does 
not change the fact that ancient Greeks lived in a world where the gods 
were created in the image of humans, which means that the triad of the 
ultimate values – Truth, Goodness, and Beauty – could come into ex-
istence only through the heroic effort of man and only in the horizontal 
 9 Plato, Lysis, 219d, trans. B. Jowett, http://classics.mit.edu/Plato/lysis.html (19.01.2018).
 10 Plato, Symposium, 209a6–7, trans. B. Jowett, http://classics.mit.edu/Plato/symposium.html 
(19.01.2018). 
 11 Plato, Symposium, op. cit., 210c1–3.
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(interpersonal) space, and especially in the most noble, gratuitous, and 
free relationship known as friendship.
Vita Activa: Playground of Metaphysical Heroism
The horizontal dimension of life in ancient Greece is also related to 
the importance attached to public life, as the mainspring of freedom. This 
was the only place where the one-dimensional reality in which humans 
and gods dwelled together (albeit with the latter residing in the heights 
of Mount Olympus and having access to the nectar of immortality) was 
opened to the vertical, transcendent dimension. Even if, starting from 
the modern age, public life has been equated with the vita active, and as 
such opposed to the vita contemplativa, the first and proper antagonist 
to the public life of antiquity was the private life.
For the Greeks, privacy was a sphere of twofold slavery: the slavery of 
submission (of women and slaves) and the slavery of domination (pow-
er binding the master to his property). This enslaved type of private life, 
entangled in the double-edged relationships of submission and domina-
tion, is very suggestively described by Pierre Manent12 in his discussion 
of the Achaeans’ superiority to the Trojans, as depicted by Homer in the 
Iliad. In the opinion of the French philosopher, the most expressive ex-
ample of Greek fortitude was not their undeniable courage on the bat-
tlefield (“The Achaeans, however, breathing fury, firm in resolve to aid 
each other, came on in silence”13), but the distance kept in private life, or 
rather the mature separation between private and public life – between 
the will to possess (being a specific form of slavery) and the ability to exist 
in the social world, which often requires dedication and sacrifice. Manent 
describes this difference using the suggestive example of the relationship 
between Paris and Helen (an Achaean embarrassed by the entire story 
and despising her sexual submission14) who is his unlawful “property,” and 
 12 P. Manent, Metamorphoses of the City: On the Western Dynamic, Cambridge 2013.
 13 Homer, The Iliad, London 1998, III, 8–9.
 14 Cf. Homer, The Iliad, op. cit., III, 441–447.
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the relationship between Achilles and Briseis who is his lawful “property.” 
The weak Paris abducts and enslaves Helen, becoming enslaved himself as 
he is unable to disown her, even in the face of the good of the entire na-
tion being at stake, and none of the Trojans is able to stop him or at least 
create some form of common opposition. In turn, Achilles, proud and 
strong, a son of the gods, at the (unjust) order of Agamemnon, disowns 
Briseis. The truth about the ascetic fortitude of the Greeks is expressed 
even more distinctly by Zbigniew Herbert, in his poem Why The Classics, 
succinctly describing the case of Thucydides. In book four of the History 
of the Peloponnesian War, speaking of a  failed military expedition that 
resulted in exile from his home city, Thucydides mentions only that “he 
had seven ships, it was winter, and he sailed quickly.”15 This self-restraint 
in describing one’s own sorrowful situation is a  literary expression of 
asceticism of the spirit, which becomes particularly clear in the context 
of the importance the Greeks attached to public life. The fact that it was 
the only place to experience freedom and a truly human life means that 
the price paid by the succinct Thucydides was even higher than that paid 
by all later exiles, “[…] whining on their knees before posterity, praising 
their heroism and innocence.”16
Remaining humbly in shadow, listening, keeping a spiritual distance, 
acting freely, cooperating with others and renouncing one’s self for the 
common good (which, though, was not separate from the individual 
good), and all in silence. These were the features that were manifested in 
Greek culture in a number of ways: in Homer’s description of the Achae-
an camp, in Spartan fortitude, in Plato’s ideal of the state, in the solitary 
nature of Greek tragedy and the cathartic nature of joint theatrical per-
formances, in discussions at the agora, and in conversations between 
the friends/members of the Academic school. For the Greeks, all these 
places were schools for transcending oneself; schools of public life. The 
demonstration of virtues in public life show its importance to the Greeks: 
the public life was deeply spiritual, much more so than religious rites 
 15 Z. Hebert, Dlaczego klasycy, in: Z. Hebert, 89 wierszy, Kraków 2003, p. 48.
 16 Z. Herbert, Why The Classics, op. cit., p. 48.
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and offerings made to vindictive gods. The Greeks, who did not know 
the grace of redemption that Christianity brings, had to win immortality 
with their own hands: by deserving it, by making themselves immortal 
through their words or actions, to be later described by a bard or a poet 
in the “kingdom without limit and the city of ashes.”17 Therefore, pub-
lic life was the only place to experience freedom, to practise courage, 
lose one’s life, transcend oneself, and earn a truly dignified, human life. 
In this spiritual dimension created by the Greeks, the great strength of 
man is manifested, the strength that is capable of creating a space for 
discussion and mutual service, of discovering the nature of good, and 
of awakening the ability to persevere and sacrifice oneself without refer-
ence to external imperatives or prohibitions. This strength comes from 
the depth of one’s spirit: it is an expression of human freedom and her-
oism in its purest form.
Conclusions: Solidarity in Virtu
One should bear in mind the principal features of the Greek commu-
nity, its most predominant tones that still resonate in the contemporary 
concept of solidarity. The first, fundamental feature of those ancient soli-
dary communities was their basis in freedom and serving freedom. This 
feature manifested itself primarily in the very constitution of Greek friend-
ship: it could be established only between individuals that were formally 
free and could make it flourish, due to their being self-sufficient. Freedom 
was not only a condition, but also the essence of friendship: a man would 
become truly free only in a relationship with another man with whom 
he could talk, polemicize, and transcend his individual limits in a fight 
for the common good. In the context of Greek civic friendship, equality 
was ancillary to freedom. This was especially emphasized by Aristotle in 
his description of friendship based on virtue as a relationship between 
equals, and therefore free from domination. Equal friendship, friendship 
in the strict sense, unlike merchant or hedonistic friendship based on an 
 17 Z. Herbert, Why The Classics, op. cit., p. 48.
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exchange of services or pleasures, is a friendship in which someone is lit-
erally paid back in their own coin, like for like. It is only in such friendship 
that freedom can be given full rein.
Secondly, the fact of Greek community’s rooting in freedom was man-
ifest in the sphere of acting. This aspect can also be found in the human-
istic concepts of solidarity, such as that created by Richard Rorty,18 the 
source of which is the postmodern metaphysical void. Devoid of abso-
lute reference points, Rorty defined solidarity as a relationship of intel-
lectual uncertainty and emotional compassion. For the postmodernist 
Rorty, solidarity cannot be anchored in any “grand narrative” (such as 
rules governing traditional communities of people sharing the same 
background or beliefs), but only in irreducibly individual sensitivity to 
another man’s suffering, which creates a common “imaginary” space on-
ly when transformed into an act of helping a neighbour. This individual 
act of creation of a solidary community, despite age gaps and intellectual 
disparities, captures the same moment of heroic effort that was made by 
Camus’ Sisyphus19 or the many other Greek heroes, philosophers, and 
statesmen who, in their Promethean courage and honour, tried to tame 
the austere world and uncover the divine in human nature.
The second feature of solidary communities was their basis in virtue 
and serving virtue. A community of friends, warriors, or philosophers 
was focused on achieving the greater good: honour, justice, truth, and 
reciprocally actualized these noble values. The question of the rela-
tionship between solidarity and virtue (or generally speaking, ethical 
principles) is an I mportant concern in many contemporary discus-
sions of solidarity. Greek friendship was established between noble men 
and grew out of mutual love for “the good,” and spreading this good 
throughout life. Still, many communities display some form of internal 
loyalty, which is by no means intended to serve any form of external 
good (e.g. the “solidarity” of the Sicilian mafia). The question arises: 
what distinguishes a truly solidary community from an apparent one? 
 18 R. Rorty, Contingency, Irony and Solidarity, Cambridge 1989.
 19 A. Camus, The Myth of Sisyphus, and Other Essays, New York 1991.
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Does the internal structure of a solidary community not oblige its mem-
bers to display some – even diluted – form of solidarity in its relations 
with the outside world? Must it not remain potentially open? This, in 
fact, is a question about the boundaries of solidarity, a question about 
the relationship between its internal and external rules, the tension be-
tween the particularism of solidary communities and the universalism 
of brotherhood. There is no doubt that for solidarity to remain a dense 
relationship based on authentic trust, even if dispersed, it must guard 
its boundaries. On the other hand, some sort of external friendliness 
is necessary to keep a solidary community from turning into its own 
antithesis, as in the case of the French Revolution. As one of its leaders, 
Georges Danton, pointedly stated before being guillotined, the revolution 
had devoured its children like Saturn. So the ideal of Greek friendship 
convincingly shows that solidarity must include a “third element”: the 
proton philon, the idea of truth, goodness, and beauty. Virtue would lay 
the fundaments for the “house of solidarity,” although obviously in an-
cient Greece, entry to this house was strictly reserved for select social 
groups (men, the free, and the self-sufficient). Universalism and the 
requirement of friendly regulation of relationships with enemies was 
introduced on a large scale by Christianity.
2. The Judeo-Christian Tradition: Abundance in Privacy
“Triumph of Gentleness”
The thesis that the culture of the West was shaped drawing on two 
sources, Athens and Jerusalem, is an obvious one. However, Manent 
formulates it in a new, intriguing way, emphasising the creative ten-
sion between civic action (born in the Greek polis, expanded within the 
republican or “Roman” tradition), and the Christian Word that opens 
the unbridgeable chasm between actions and words in a political socie-
ty.20 It is worth investigating how both these traditions, in their creative 
 20 P. Manent, Metamorphoses of the City: On the Western Dynamic, op. cit., p. 20.
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dialectics, have affected the shape of the concept of solidarity and what 
the differentiae specificae are between the Judeo-Christian and Greek 
cultures against this dialectic background.
The most distinctive feature of the Judeo-Christian tradition is its 
far-reaching criticism of public authority. Criticism of it by Greek phi-
losophers was rational (Socrates, as befits a gadfly, bit the citizens taking 
a stroll at the agora; Plato, disappointed with the end of this story conceived 
visions of the ideal state, and Aristotle, displaying his typical reserve and 
common sense, introduced a classification of state systems from least to 
most oppressive). Criticism of public authority by the Jews was of a sub-
stantialist nature. In principle (as confirmed by a number of exceptions), 
the Jews despised authority and shunned it. This is most clearly exposed 
in the fable related by Jotham in the Book of Judges, in which the good 
trees refused the crown as they did not hold it in high regard, while the 
least noble tree – the thorn bush – accepted it.21 So why the nonchalance? 
The process of iconoclasm with respect to human-made deities began 
in the Old Testament. God presents himself as the one who is (“I am”) and 
the reality of this existence goes beyond the imaginary. The iconoclastic 
faith of the Jews – believing in one God who is beyond human imagina-
tion that at the same time enters into a covenant with men – introduc-
es a completely new, vertical order: the order of ultimate hope. God is 
no longer an improved version of man due to his Olympic immortality 
(with the vice and weakness being equally onerous), but transcends any 
personal reality: “For I am God and not man.”22 This reality changes the 
metaphysical perspective – the covenant with God is a school of freedom, 
courage, and trust, as well of acting. It is a creative, independent activity 
par excellence, which also deals in creating new beginnings.
The books of the Old Testament are a confirmation of the revolution-
ary power of this new, vertical covenant with God: a social revolution 
is taking place almost everywhere. The first stage of this revolution was 
the breaking free of family bonds, with Abraham the first revolutionary. 
 21 Cf. Book of Judges 9:7–14.
 22 Hosea 11:9.
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The father of faith was called to “[…] go from his country, his people 
and his father’s household to the land God will show him,”23 to which 
command he responded with trust and courage. This escape from family 
bonds is further emphasized in the binding of Isaac, which has proved 
so intriguing to a number of philosophers.24 The fact that this did not 
actually occur seems to indicate that the God of Israel, unlike the deities 
of neighbouring peoples, for example Moloch, does not want children 
to be sacrificed to him, desiring instead radical freedom for Abraham: 
freedom from family bonds and, seemingly, freedom from the image of 
the evil, bloody God. Abraham’s revolution is an individual revolution, 
but it produces results for his immediate environment. Soon after, a so-
cial revolution par excellence occurs. The Book of Exodus stands as tes-
timony to this revolution, with its story of the Israelites being led out of 
slavery in Egypt, where they had suffered under the despotic rule of the 
pharaoh. By the power of this revolution Israel is formed as a nation, 
the “chosen people.” The revolutionary nature of this act is suggestively 
illustrated by the Red Sea crossing, which is made by the Israelites while 
dancing, led by a woman playing a timbrel (Miriam, sister of Aaron). In 
this way, Miriam exemplifies the deep nature of the social revolution. It 
was not only liberation from the despotic power of the Egyptian tyrant 
and, gradually, from all forms of domination of one man over another, 
but also a transition from slavery to internal freedom and independence, 
from fear to gentleness, from huddling to dancing.
The Dynamics of Inclusion and Tolerance
The social revolution witnessed in the books of the Old Testament 
becomes even more radical in the New Testament. Jesus, the main pro-
tagonist, would break out of the existing social order at almost every 
opportunity. This manifested itself in two ways: in his particular attitude 
to the helpless, the unprivileged, and the excluded (traitors, lepers, and 
 23 Genesis 12:1.
 24 Cf. S. Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, London 1986, p. 13–23.
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pagans), and on the other hand, in his despising of any form of author-
ity, including religious authority (the Pharisees, the Sadducees, and the 
Jewish dignitaries). However, the actions and teachings of Jesus were not 
intended to bring about a political revolution (“My kingdom is not of 
this world,”25 he says, disappointing his disciples), but a transformation 
within the sole idea and purpose of authority. His intended paradigm 
shift was most clearly expressed in the washing of the feet of the Apos-
tles during the last supper. This act, reserved for the lowest servants, is 
performed by the master and the sage, the teacher of the community, the 
nominal authority figure – the Messiah, as his disciples believed. This 
gesture is a firm expression of the revolutionary change in understanding 
authority, which from now on should become service, its vector going 
not only upwards, but also downwards: the purpose of authority is not to 
take, but to give, not to rule, but to serve. This direction has (or at least 
should have) defined the structure of subsequent Christian communi-
ties, starting from the largest, the Catholic Church, the head of which is 
referred to as the servant of the servants of God, and ending with other 
minor religious orders and charities.
Breaking up not only the structures, but also the idea of authority her-
alds completely new social dynamics. Its motor is no longer the desire to 
rule or be ruled (the latter, though paradoxical, exists and has been most 
pointedly described by Erich Fromm,26 and in literature by Fiodor Dos-
toyevsky27), but the principle of brotherhood and loving thy neighbour. 
Following on from the abandonment of family structures and other social 
structures by Abraham and his descendants, this brotherhood has a spe-
cial nature and cannot be understood as the sentimental fraternité. It is, 
however, an obligation to endorse the universalism that the Greek com-
munity of friends lacked, with its exclusivity for men of a certain social 
status. In contrast, this new universalism, resulting from the idea of divine 
filiation, manifests itself primarily through radical openness to “others” 
 25 John 18:33b–37.
 26 E. Fromm, Escape form Freedom, New York 1994.
 27 Cf. the legend of the Grand Inquisitor in The Brothers Karamazov.
21  Solidarity in the Classical Tradition
(pagans, the non-kosher, and the non-circumcised28), and also through 
gradual transformation of existing communities: the abolition of slavery 
and a slow change in the social situation of women. Christian communi-
ties not only extended the circles of their internal solidarity, but also fol-
lowed the rules of solidary co-existence with persons remaining outside 
the communities, in accordance with Jesus’ call to love one’s enemies. One 
interesting, minimalist interpretation of this demanding commandment 
comes from John Locke’s Letter Concerning Toleration. He perceived it 
to be an invitation to religious freedom based on mutual respect and the 
right to public worship, and an obligation of non-interference.
Paradoxically, in spite of an active attempt to love their enemies, 
Christians were accused of odium humani generis (hatred of the human 
race).29 The modi vivendi of the first Christians were so different from 
those that were prevalent in the Roman Empire, gathered around the 
semi-divine figure of Cesar and the sanctified family hearth guarded 
by the Vestals, that this expression does not seem exaggerated. The rift 
between republican civic actions and the Christian word that opened 
a completely new space not subordinated to authority, as mentioned 
by Manent, is visible here. The first to notice this tension was St. Au-
gustine, who crystallised it in the concept of the two cities. The bone 
of contention between them is the attitude to authority: the earthly city 
is based on the relationships of ruling, while the heavenly city is based 
on the relationships of serving. What is particularly valuable is that 
St. Augustine does not offer simplifying juxtapositions (e.g. by defi-
nitely placing the heavenly state on the Christian side), but displaying 
deep anthropological perceptiveness, he roots both cities in the human 
condition (referring, along the lines of Romulus and Remus, to the bib-
lical characters of Cain and Abel). The human condition is, in princi-
ple, composed of good human nature and free will, which includes the 
 28 The Acts of the Apostles document the effort required to create a world in which “[…] there 
is neither Jew nor Gentile, neither slave nor free, nor is there male and female, for you are all one in 
Christ Jesus” (Galatians 3:28).
 29 Tacitus, Annals, XV, 44, http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext% 
3A1999.02.0078%3Abook%3D15%3Achapter%3D44 (19.01.2018).
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possibility of diabolical evil (most clearly expressed in the Augustinian 
account of stealing pears from an orchard30), the main driving force 
behind which is the desire to rule (pride). The border between the two 
cities is therefore not an external wall running along political or even 
religious divisions, but an internal one, the locus of which lies in hu-
man will. Ultimately, the source of the expansion of the “earthly city” 
with its often inhuman rules, is not some sort of an external “system,” 
but man himself, as such. This discovery gives birth not so much to 
the necessity of limiting external authority, but rather to the postulate 
of constant vigilance – self-limitation of all authority and continued 
mistrust towards its overly expansive manifestations.
The philosophy of St. Augustine well represents the ambivalence of 
human nature enlightened by Christianity. Christian anthropology clearly 
exposes man’s limits. These are not only his physical finitude, but also his 
limited abilities: bounded rationality31, imperfect cognition and a corrupt-
ed heart.32 Having explored the corners of his soul, St. Augustin didn’t 
have any illusions: Cain was able to kill Abel out of pure envy, Judas be-
trayed his beloved Master and Augustine himself not only occasionally 
stole pears from an orchard, but notoriously cheated his saintly mother, 
Monika. At first glance, radically sincere but corrupt Augustine might 
look less encouraging than the dignified figures of the ancient heroes – 
brave Achilles, or the rebellious, self-sacrificing Prometheus. However, 
these pictures do not prejudge the general nature of ancient and Chris-
tian anthropology. The efforts of the ancient heroes were hopeless (albeit 
captivating), as they tried to win immortality against unfavourable or 
even vindictive gods, relentlessly pursued by fate, so well expressed in 
the ancient tragedies. Achilles’ freedom was a radiant but short moment 
of fame and glory on the battlefield, which nevertheless condemned the 
hero to a tragic ending. In contrast to its ancient predecessor, Christian 
freedom is not an illusionary moment of triumph over fate, but a gift 
 30 Cf. St. Augustine, The Confessions of St. Augustine, New York 1960, p. 28.
 31 Cf. D. Kahmenan, Thinking Past and Slow, New York 2011, passim.
 32 Cf. I. Kant, Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, Cambridge 1995, passim.
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given once and for all that can be abused by the recipient but not con-
sumed by irrevocable fate. Christian anthropology has its own concept 
of “gravity of evil,” observed on Augustine’s example and expressed in 
the doctrine of original sin. The contagion of human nature renders his 
efforts to realize higher values (including the value of solidarity) imper-
fect, and sometimes brutally utopian. This causes man’s propensity to do 
evil, limits his freedom and often shrinks his horizons to the narrowly 
egotistic. Still, the heritage of original sin is not tragic: it does not op-
erate as predestination, nor inevitable fate, but causes man’s inclination 
towards evil and burdens the freedom of his will, so well expressed in 
Saint Paul’s famous phrase, “I do not do the good I want to do, but the 
evil I do not want to do.”33 Despite this heavy load, man’s sinfulness, if 
experienced in humilitas, can open him to forgiveness and amaze with 
the lightness of its grace.
Vita Contemplativa: “The Unbearable Lightness of Being”
“It should be mistrust” is the artistic credo of Stanisław Barańczak, an 
outstanding Polish poet, translator, and essayist, formulated in his collection 
under the significant title Etyka i poetyka [Ethics and Poetics].34 Barańczak 
adds that “[…] this is the only thing that justifies its [poetry’s] existence.”35 
Barańczak’s credo is paradoxical, and can be seen as the credo of post-
war Polish poetry as a whole (cf. Czesław Miłosz’s lyrical question “What 
is poetry which does not save nations or people?”36). On the one hand, 
Barańczak questions the ratio essendi of traditional poetry, with its admi-
ration of the “ladies’ dresses spinning around”37 and surges of emotions, 
 33 Romans 7:19.
 34 S. Barańczak, Etyka i poetyka, Kraków 2009.
 35 S. Barańczak, Parę przypuszczeń na temat poezji współczesnej, in: S. Barańczak, Etyka i poetyka, 
op. cit., p. 497–498.
 36 Cf. Cz. Miłosz, Dedication, in: The Collected Poems: 1931–1987, New York 1988; URL=https://
www.poetryfoundation.org/poems/49458/dedication-56d22b9082a83 (19.01.2018).
 37 Probably the last Polish poem, praising women’s dresses light-heartedly is Sur le pont d’Avignon 
by Krzysztof Kamil Baczyński, a subsequent victim of the Warsaw Uprising, written in the midst of 
World War II, on his hospital bed in 1941. 
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while on the other hand he “coaches the voice”38 of Settembrini39 very high-
ly, attributing the function of saving men and nations to him. This disbe-
lief in the meaning of poetry is understandable when viewed in historical 
context: on the one hand, the word seems to have died together with God 
(Barańczak’s concern is reminiscent of Hans Jonas’ questioning of the idea 
of God after Auschwitz40). On the other hand, the word born in the new 
reality (communist newspeak) did not work ad rem, but was intended to 
shape, in accordance with the arbitrary assumption of a criminal ideolo-
gy, a brave new world. The historical situation fully explains the need to 
re-justify poetry, rendering the concurrent belief in the creative, salutary 
power of the word even more daring. Where does this belief originate? 
Where does this spirit of mistrust, criticism, and defiance of authority and 
its means of coercion, terror, and even holocaust come from? This spirit 
that connects Barańczak (who declares himself in Ethics and poetics to be 
an atheist) with the Jewish princess Miriam and with St. Augustine, one of 
the greatest Church Fathers. Where is the source of resistance?
In another form, this question was asked by Arendt: “Where are we 
when we think?”41 Poetry and philosophy are expressions of the same 
activity. The question of where we are while thinking is justified insofar 
as the experience of thinking does actually require some form of with-
drawal from the world. Arendt quotes Paul Valéry: “Tantôt je pense, 
tantônt je suis” – “Sometimes I think, sometimes I am,” juxtaposing “be-
ing” with “thinking.” Although thinking cannot be equated with solip-
sism or escapism, the activity itself contains something that in a sense 
justifies the tendency to back away from the world. There is no doubt 
that thinking is a form of getting away from the evil world, a form of 
 38 Cf. S. Barańczak, Voice Coaching, trans. S. Barańczak and C. Cavanagh, “Metamorphoses: 
A Journal of Literary Translation” 7 (1999) 2, p. 112–114.
 39 In the essay Zmieniony głos Settembriniego [The changed voice of Settembrini], Barańczak 
gives poetry the role of carrying out the ethical postulates of Settembrini: the ideal figure of the 
‘Western man,’ as Thomas Mann depicts him in The Magic Mountain.
 40 H. Jonas, The Concept of God after Auschwitz: A Jewish Voice, “Journal of Religion” 67 (1987), 
p. 1–13. 
 41 H. Arendt, The Life of the Mind, San Diego 1981, passim.
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internal emigration. What’s more, for thinking to be a source of creative 
mistrust and defiance, it cannot be otherwise. Even escapist forms of in-
ternal life prove, indirectly, that this withdrawal carries a great, positive 
force that can bear fruit in the form of art, philosophy, creative activity, 
individual rebellion and solidary revolution. Therefore, it turns out that 
this “nowhere” holds a reservoir of creative power and the power to act, 
and that “nonexistence” is an infinite source of existence. The activity 
of thinking is more than just a withdrawal, as withdrawal is linked with 
another type of movement: entering. Over the ages, this movement has 
progressed along different paths, leading Socrates to his own conscience 
and teaching him to stay in dialogue with himself (“The Soul selects her 
own society, Then shuts the door”42). It led Plato to examine eternal ideas 
and to contemplate the logic of the universe and discover its rules. It also 
led the Jewish philosopher and Carmelite nun Edith Stein to enter into 
conversation with the God-Logos. In each case, this conversation is ac-
companied by a powerful positive experience, an experience of internal 
freedom and creative élan. An important element of this experience is 
the fact of it being given for free, as expressed in the Christian (especially 
Protestant) tradition through the doctrine of grace, and in philosophical 
tradition, through consolation offered by philosophy. The abundance of 
a  life experienced in privacy has one more seminal consequence: one 
does not need to fight for power over one’s mortality. Ancient heroes 
had to win immortality with their own hands through courage or talent, 
overcoming internal and external obstacles and risking their life, while 
for philosophers, poets, and monks, it was enough to peacefully talk to 
the Logos and contemplate the eternal ideas in a cave. This approach, 
which shifts the emphasis from deserving to receiving and which hails 
humility and not greatness as the primary virtue, is also a certain type 
of a scandal of the mind. To an external observer, this scandal may be 
unbearable, but for an engaged participant it is the source of internal 
freedom and a joyful lightness of being.
 42 E. Dickinson, 303, in: E. Dickinson, The Complete Poems, Faber& Faber 2016, URL= https://
www.poets.org/poetsorg/poem/soul-selects-her-own-society-303 (22.01.2018).
26 Aleksandra Głos 
3. Conclusions: Solidarity as a Freedom-Enhancer
The experience of metaphysical lightness is fraught with consequences 
in the socio-political area. It redirects the chosen people from the met-
aphysical battlefield to the social one: a revolution the purpose of which 
is not to obtain power over oneself and one’s mortality, but to leave the 
“house of slavery.” Crossing the Red Sea, the formation of a people with-
out a land, is a new type of revolution and harbinger of a new sphere: 
the social sphere. The birth of this sphere is ultimately confirmed by the 
Christian principle of brotherhood, establishing new types of interper-
sonal relations not rooted in the striving for political power. Thus, room 
is created for a new type of liberty: “liberty of the Moderns.” This type of 
liberty has two aspects, internal and external. The internal draws on the 
movement to the inside, which allows for creation ex nihilo, i.e. creation 
of new things and new beginnings. As such, it necessarily offers space for 
idiosyncrasy, a place for radical individualism. On the other hand, the 
experience of such unbearably light, gratuitous freedom is not locked in 
an internal fortress, but naturally expands beyond its boundaries, “in-
fects,” and usually expresses itself in the external dimension of vita activa 
and spontaneous formation of solidary communities.
Examples of such solidary communities don’t only include charities of 
a more or less religious provenance, acting for “social justice” or equality. 
Freedom is a way for goodness to exist,43 and the first distinctive feature 
of such solidary communities is the freedom and spontaneity of their 
formation. Other examples include medieval guilds, associations of art-
ists and scientists (starting with universities with their artes liberales), as 
well as all kinds of societies and clubs, such as those described by Robert 
Putnam: American bowling clubs and Italian football clubs44 that deter-
mined the vitality of American and Italian societies, as well as business 
communities and joint ventures that, in spite of acting for profit, go far 
 43 As observed by philosopher, Józef Tischner, commenting on the Solidarity movement.
 44 Cf. R. D. Putnam, Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy, Princeton 1993, 
passim and Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community, New York 2000, passim.
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beyond the business model typical of the homo oeconomicus (operating 
instead operating like those Three Musketeers: “All for one and one for 
all,” etc). Such communities, even though they determine the shape of 
democracy and make it work, are not focused on obtaining political pow-
er. They are intended for other purposes: sports, science, art, business – 
purposes Immanuel Kant would define as per se. As such, they are the 
germs of a different kind of politics (poli-ethics as Hannah Arendt might 
put it), which instead of striving for power, constitutes free cooperation. 
In this sense, Alexis de Tocqueville’s famous claim that the passion for 
democracy and the yearning for freedom are not the same, is justified.
Solidarity is a revolutionary concept. Regardless of the place and time, 
it points in one direction: out of the house of slavery. As Adam Zagajew-
ski was right to observe, one can leave the house of slavery in two ways: 
by holding a banner and singing revolutionary songs, or by leaving the 
French way, with a tome of poetry in hand.45 Solidarity is necessary to 
make each of these revolutionary gestures. In the first case, this would 
be solidarity in the most literal sense, the same one that signed itself in 
red letters on the revolutionary banners in Poland. In the latter, it would 
be metaphorical solidarity, with “[…] the company of your ancestors: 
Gilgamesh Hector Roland the defenders of the kingdom without limit 
and the city of ashes,” starting from another place (cf. “Where am I when 
I am thinking?”) and leading to another place (meta forum): “Go where 
those others went to the dark boundary.”46 The revolutionary nature of 
solidarity proves that it is a liberal concept. Sources of common broth-
erhood should not be looked for in the utopian equality of all men, nor 
do they spring from individual compassion or compassion generalized 
as an abstract love of humankind, but from the yearning for freedom 
that every human knows, from dignity one unexpectedly finds in them-
selves, and from getting out of oppressive situations. The pictures of the 
revolutions – Jews crossing the Red Sea, ancient Greek heroes valuing 
 45 Cf. A. Zagajewski, The Little Larousse, in: A. Zagajewski, Solidarity, Solitude: Essays, Michigan 
1990, p. 101.
 46 Z. Herbert, Why The Classics, op. cit., p. 48.
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honour over life, Polish workers transforming the iron and dull scenery 
of the Gdańsk Shipyard into a living stage of a performative word and 
laboratory of new social ideas – expressively reveal the intimate weave 
of freedom and solidarity. Revolution is, however, only a symbol, an ex-
ternal manifestation of the liberal nature of solidarity, and the depth of 
the freedom-solidarity entanglement is not exhausted by the history of 
metaphysical, social or political fight. Ancient Academics, inspired by 
Plato’s Diotyma, breeding in each other beauty, the Order of Hospitallers 
setting up a new clinic or a group of contemporary astrophysicists look-
ing passionately for a new star, are all alternative, equally legitimate ex-
amples of solidarity. They are not necessarily triggering any revolutions 
in a political or social sense, but bring radical novelty in the form of ar-
tistic innovation, moral audacity or “Copernican revolution” in science. 
They share the same pursuit for freedom and breed the same miracle 
of widening the spectrum of human knowledge, and do so by the same 
freedom-releasing modus operandi, which will be described below.
The first distinctive freedom-enhancing feature of these associations is 
the fact that they act in higher aims, whether revolutionary, artistic, moral 
or scientific. Solidary associations are not set up for profit, and that in itself, 
in the contemporary prevalent market culture, is liberating. Even if at its 
etymological and historical beginnings solidarity was a joint venture, which 
was the ancient form of business cooperation, the term solidarity described 
not the business relation itself, but the special, “solid” kind of responsibility, 
adopted in this enterprise, which placed on each debtor the responsibili-
ty for the whole debt (“one for all, all for one”). This radical responsibility 
distinguished solidarity cooperation from ordinary cooperation based on 
interest. It clearly indicates that such cooperation is guided by a different 
kind of logic than the narrow, contemporarily prevalent, calculative rational-
ity of homo oeconomicus. The rationality behind it is Max Weber’s axiological 
understanding: values here not only set general goals and instruct singular 
actions, but also operate as a currency between actors in a solidary venture, 
enabling them to communicate and trust each other deeply enough to take 
up radical obligatio in solidum for one another’s debt. Axiological rationality 
gives solidarity its liberal character – it introduces gift relationships, unfolds 
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horizons wider than narrow self-interest, and opens up the possibility of 
altruism.47 In the course of non-instrumental, axiological action, one can 
recognize and experience the dynamics of personal freedom – and this is 
not only because of the pathos of this action, the novelty and revolution-
ary character of its outcomes, but also, paradoxically, because of the onus 
of radical responsibility, which, in Kantian terms, proves by the appeal of 
“ought” that this moral obligation also “can” be fulfilled – that is, that a man 
is free. This movement in the spirit radical opens a transcendental dimen-
sion in humans, inviting them not only to beat their own egoism, but also 
to rise above the existing form of the world. As such, it opens a perspective 
of radical novelty and miracles.
The second argument for the liberal nature of solidarity references 
this transcendental movement in sprit. On the social level, it appears in 
the form of common actions undertaken with a higher aim. Solidarity as 
a form of non-instrumental cooperation is the best example of “common 
action” in the Arendtian sense.48 To understand, the transcendental na-
ture of common action. Hannah Arendt distinguishes action from other 
activities, such as work and production. The latter can be undertaken by 
humans, but they do not develop proper human potential – the working 
person is only an animal laborans, the producing one – a homo faber. 
Common action, which can be regarded as a synonym of solidarity, is, 
as Arendt writes, the only “miracle-making” human activity, a way for 
freedom to come into existence. Firstly, because contrary to work and 
production, it does not deal with money or materials, but in both of its 
versions – praxis and lexis – with other people. Secondly, and most impor-
tantly, because it is not aimed at maintenance of one’s biological life (this 
is another dimension of non-instrumentality), but at making the world 
better and more human. This process of humanizing the world even more 
visibly than in the agora (for Arendt, this was a prototype for common 
action), was demonstrated during the Polish Solidarity carnival, which 
tangibly turned rusting factories from places of monotonous production 
 47 Cf. T. Nagel, Possibility of Altrusim, Princeton 1969, passim.
 48 Cf. H. Arendt, The Human Condition, Chicago 1958, passim. 
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and personal humiliation (aimed at reduction of humans to homo faber, in 
line with communist ideology), into arenas bursting with political debate 
and artistic creation. Undeniably, a highly inspiring role in triggering this 
miracle was played by John Paul II and his teachings, especially his book 
Osoba i czyn,49 which is a tribute to human action. Wojtyła distinguished 
the actus hominis – a process or event taking place in humans or that can 
happen to them – from the actus humanus, which he understood as the 
highest expression of human personality and activation of the dynamics 
of human freedom. In this book he restored a proper sense of the world, 
against communist “newspeak,” and a deep sense of action (and common 
action) against the communist cult of work and production.
The picture of solidarity that emerges from these analyses presents it as 
a freedom-releasing and freedom-enhancing power. The reasons for this are, 
firstly, metaphysical and grandiose: solidarity from its very beginnings has 
been a playground for metaphysical heroism and a way to prove that there 
are some goods, such as the virtue of honour, or the value of friendship for 
Greeks and the love of God for Christians which were worth the radical 
commitment and consecration of one’s life. Such a commitment and conse-
cration allowed one to transcend one’s own biological condition and create 
a higher, human order. Ethics of commitment translated on a on a social 
and pragmatic level, created a safe ground for individuality to flourish. 
This was evident during the Solidarity movement, where the existence of 
a fraternal group allowed individuals to take the initiative and speak their 
mind, knowing that there would be someone ready to pay their debt in 
case of persecution. This interdependency can be translated to wider social 
relations, showing that the culture of liberty needs the culture of respon-
sibility and assistance to succeed. Some amount of voluntary and non-in-
strumental solidarity is necessary for all individual rights and freedoms to 
prosper. Without social solidarity, individual rights become intrusive and 
freedoms negative and isolating, which in the longer perspective leads 
to a market version of bellum omnium contra omnes. Thusly conceived 
solidarity is far from an oppressive culture of collectivity, but nourishes 
 49 K. Wojtyła, Osoba i czyn, Kraków 1969.
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a culture of relational individuality instead. It works as a social guarantee 
for all the most exquisite individual values and all the creative potential it 
brings. Such a close relationship between solidarity and freedom puts the 
idea of solidarity that is prevalent today in the right perspective. Solidari-
ty, as a freedom-enhancing power, invites another model of relations, and 
another policy other than the welfare-based obligation to help the most 
“needy,” via progressive taxation: a policy based on dialogue, negotiation, 
and dispute, rather than violence or any different kind of domination (such 
as of the welfare-based Leviathan, trading freedom for safety and social 
security). It promotes human growth and flourishing, enhances the spirit 
of innovativeness and cooperation and strives to create as many free agorae 
as possible, thus enabling the “miracle” of bottom-up solidarity.
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Abstract
Solidarity in the Classical Tradition50
Solidarity is a “miracle,” and not only because of the relative rarity of spontane-
ous, trusting, non-instrumental cooperation in todays’ atomized societies, but also be-
cause of its inexplicable, invariably striking fundament – human freedom. This essay 
investigates the nature of “miracles,” drawing on two giant traditions – the ancient, Judaeo-
-Christian. The image of solidarity that emerges from this analysis proves that solidarity 
is originally and irreducibly a freedom-enhancing concept.
Keywords
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Abstrakt 
Solidarność w tradycji klasycznej
Solidarność jest „cudem”. Zasługuje ona na takie miano nie tylko ze względu na 
relatywną rzadkość nieinstrumentalnej, spontanicznej i pełnej ufności współpracy we 
 50 The article was written as part of the “Solidarity as an ethical and legal principle” research 
project (No. 2015/17/N/HS5/00434), financed by the National Science Centre.
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współczesnych zatomizowanych społeczeństwach, lecz także ze względu na swój niewy-
tłumaczalny i niezmiennie fascynujący fundament: ludzką wolność. Artykuł opisuje na-
turę „cudów” na przykładzie dwóch klasycznych tradycji myśli europejskiej: antycznej 
i judeochrześcijańskiej. Obraz solidarności wyłaniający się z tej analizy dowodzi, że soli-
darność jest źródłowo i nieredukowalnie fenomenem liberalnym, a więc ufundowanym 
na wolności i pomnażającym wolność.
Słowa kluczowe
solidarność, przyjaźń obywatelska, wspólne działanie, Hanna Arendt, Arystoteles
